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Abstract: Nigeria is a federal constitutional republic comprising of 36 states 
and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The states are further sub-divided 
into 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs). This paper examines issues 
concerning agitation for restructuring and resource control in Nigeria. The 
study through content analysis of documents examined the factors that led to 
the agitation for re-structuring, salient issues raised and the constitutional 
basis for re-structuring. It is discovered that in Nigeria the agitation revolves 
around resource control, review of revenue sharing formula, devolution of 
power, return to regional federal system of government based on six geo-
political zones, return to parliamentary system of government, removal of 
immunity clause from the constitution, creation of state police, role of 
traditional rulers, among others. The finding also shows that Nigerians- 
individually and in groups, across regions and ethnic divides have been 
advocating for one or more aspect(s) of restructuring Nigeria’s federal system. 
The study therefore recommended restructuring in order to enhance national 
unity, peaceful co-existence, political stability and balanced national 
development. Beyond restructuring however, the failure of governance at all 
levels due to poor leadership, mismanagement, and corruption must be 
addressed. 
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Introduction 
Countries in the world over adopt 
political arrangements that best suit 
their nature, context and composition. 
In some cases, for instance, this 
arrangement facilitates a substantial 
amount of co-operation among the 
various segments and institutions all in 
a bid to achieve the desired end of the 
good life for the citizens(Alsamee, 
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Abdul-Wahab & Yusof, 2016).The 
federal system is one of such political 
systems mostly adopted by 
heterogeneous societies/states (Alsamee 
et al, 2016; Babalola, 2016; 
Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; 
Elekwa, Mathew & Akume, 2011; 
Ewetan, 2012; Ezeji-Okoye, 2009). 
Similarly, it is in this regard of 
heterogeneous nature that Nigeria 
adopts and practices federalism as a 
system of government where some 
certain political, administrative and 
economic powers/functions are shared 
between the central government and its 
component units(Babalola, 2016; 
Chukwuemeka &Amobi, 2011; 
Elekwaet al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012; Ezeji-
Okoye, 2009).It is in this regard that for 
instance a classical scholar such as 
Tamuno (1983) sees Nigeria’s 
federalism as a form of government 
where the component units of its 
political organization participate in 
sharing some powers and functions in a 
co-operative manner though the 
combined forces of ethnic pluralism and 
cultural diversity among others that pull 
them apart. 
Earlier in the 19th century, the British 
had conquered the different parts of 
present Nigeria at different times and 
established control and authority over 
them (Ezeji-Okoye, 2009). These areas 
were grouped into Southern and 
Northern protectorates. For the 
convenience of administration, the 
Northern and Southern protectorates 
were later amalgamated in 1914by the 
colonial masters thus resulting into 
existence the country presently called 
Nigeria (Ezeji-Okoye, 2009). However, 
as time went by, the British colonial 
rule, with its continued alienation and 
subjugation of the indigenous people, 
resulted in to agitation for self-
government. This further demonstrates 
that the political history of Nigeria was 
dominated by struggles for freedom 
especially between 1922 and 1959. In 
fact, it is now a common knowledge 
that some notable Nigerians: Sir 
Herbert Macaulay, Sir Abubakar T. 
Balewa, Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, Sir 
Ahmadu Bello, Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo, and Chief Anthony Enahoro, 
to mention but a few, are regarded as 
the founding fathers of Nigeria’s 
nationalism. 
 
Given their struggles as mentioned 
earlier, the British colonialist gave 
concessions to Nigerian activists that 
led to the rise of the series of 
constitutions that come into existence, 
to assuage their feelings. The 
constitutions included the Clifford 
constitution, 1922, Richards 
constitutions, 1946, Macpherson 
constitution, 1951 and Lyttleton’s 
constitution, 1954 that gave birth to 
Nigeria’s federal arrangement. While 
the constitutions have played significant 
roles, historical, social, political and 
cultural factors also made Nigeria’s 
adoption of federalism (Babalola, 2016; 
Elekwaet al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012; Ezeji-
Okoye, 2009). These factors are 
diversities in nationalities, religions, 
cultures, resources, and fear of 
domination among the various entities. 
In the light of this, federalism is thus 
seen as a system that grant units 
considerable freedom and autonomy in 
the internal governance of their people 
given its decentralized powers 
(Alsamee et al, 2016; Elekwa et al, 
2011; Ewetan, 2012; Chukwuemeka & 
Amobi, 2011; Ezeji-Okoye, 2009). 
Asuch, in a federal state like Nigeria, 
the constitution is supreme with shared 
powers between and among the three 
tiers of governments (Babalola, 2016; 
Alsamee et al, 2016; Chukwuemeka & 
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Amobi, 2011). Hence, in each tier, the 
government is expected to exercise 
certain control and function within its 
scope of authority. 
 
Although, federalism has being 
practiced in Nigeria over the years, the 
agitation for restructuring to achieve 
resource control or what some scholars 
termed “true federalism” including 
secession is not a new phenomenon in 
the country’s political history 
(Agwanwo, 2014; Anugwam, 2005; 
Awofeso, 2017; Babalola, 2015; 
Chijioke, Innocent & Emeh, 2012; 
Elekwa et al, 2011; Madubuike, 2015; 
Ojakorotu, 2008).Hence, it is not 
surprising from recent issues; that there 
are agitations by certain component 
units of Nigeria. In fact, it is clear that 
some parts or indeed all parts of Nigeria 
are not comfortable and satisfied with 
the present federal arrangement. Mostly 
agreed is that the central and the other 
components of the federation of Nigeria 
heavily rely on revenue allocation from 
the federation account with greater 
percentage coming from the oil 
revenues (Agwanwo, 2014; Anugwam, 
2005; Awofeso, 2017; Chijiokeet al, 
2012; Elekwa et al, 2011; Madubuike, 
2015; Ojakorotu, 2008). Within the 
context of the political economy of oil 
in Nigeria’s federation, the question of 
control as some scholars termed it 
“resource control”(Babalola, 2016; 
Chijioke et al, 2012; Dickson & Asua, 
2016; Madubuike, 2015) is not totally 
surprising. 
 
To put it specifically, Agbu (2004) had 
earlier maintained that agitation in 
Nigeria’s federal set up has 
fundamentally manifested itself over 
the quest for access and control over the 
political power to federally collect 
revenue. In addition, the rentier 
economic character of the Nigerian 
state is also a fundamental factor in 
understanding the dimension and 
interests of political forces in this 
struggle. Interestingly, the oil rent 
revenue constitutes a significant 
proportion of Nigeria’s national income 
(Agwanwo, 2014; Anugwam, 2005; 
Awofeso, 2017; Chijiokeet al, 2012; 
Elekwa et al, 2011; Madubuike, 2015; 
Ojakorotu, 2008). More disturbingly is 
that, there has been afailure of 
governance at all levels of democratic 
governance structure mostly due to bad 
leadership and corruption over the years 
(Abbas, 2013; Anugwam, 2005). In 
fact, most indicators of under 
development are still present in the 
country regardless of its varied geo 
political regions. While the idea of true 
or fiscal federalism, resource control, 
and restructuring are aimed at ensuring 
balanced national development, unity 
and peaceful co-existence have been 
debating the big question therefore 
remains “what is wrong with Nigeria’s 
federal system in view of its current 
challenges? ”Similarly, “can the current 
agitation calls through restructuring 
agenda” as pushed by some interest 
groups address the contemporary 
political and economic challenges in the 
country?” 
 
To answer the questions posed by this 
paper, there is the need to find out the 
factors responsible for the current 
agitation that is posing threat to the 
corporate existence of Nigeria. 
Specifically, it aimed to examine: 
 
1. The factors responsible for the 
consistent call for restructuring in 
Nigeria. 
2. The areas of contention or 
dissatisfaction that led to agitations, 
by extension responsible for 
threatening the political stability of 
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Nigeria in particular and corporate 
existence in general. 
3. The best ways and strategies to go 
about restructuring Nigeria’s 
federalism politically and 
economically. 
 
To achieve these objectives, this paper 
situated within political economic 
framework therefore analyzed some 
specific issues in which primacy is 
assigned to material conditions 
(Akindele and Asaolu, 2003) as 
political economy is a complex 
interaction between politics and 
economy in the development of human 
societies. Through descriptive methods 
of analysis, this paper is based on 
secondary data utilised relevant media 
reports, scholarly works and personal 
observations of the researchers. 
Essentially, most of the ideas were 
generated through political events and 
previous studies gleaned based on their 
substance, relevance and comparative 
quality to give more insight. 
Furthermore, the effort is made to link 
segments of the literature based on a 
review of studies related to the problem 
of study to the contemporary experience 
of emerging events. Overall, the 
essence is to capture and provide the 
political realities on the ground for a 
presentation of a balanced argument. 
 
Federalism and the Question of 
Resource Control in Nigeria 
Federalism in Nigeria was entrenched 
by the British imperialist power. Long 
before the creation of the political entity 
called Nigeria through its amalgamation 
in 1914, the peoples that existed have 
had an established indigenous system of 
administration (Elekwaet al, 2011; 
Ezeji-Okoye, 2009)through some 
political entities such as the Benin 
Empire, Kanem Bornu Empire, Sokoto 
caliphate, Oyo Empire, to mention a 
few. While the structure of federalism 
in Nigeria was laid by the Richards 
constitution of 1946 which introduced 
regionalism into the polity, its formal 
operation started in 1954 with the 
adoption of the Oliver Lyttleton’s 
constitution that agave substantial 
autonomy to the regions, as well as 
specific power and functions to the then 
central and other regional governments 
(Elekwaet al, 2011).In addition, the 
established federal system was further 
consolidated in 1960where Nigeria at 
independence inherited from the British 
the legacy of federalism built on three 
regions: the North, East, and West and a 
parliamentary system of government. 
 
Hence, before 1960, the various 
constitutional changes from 1922-1960 
contributed in setting a firm foundation 
for Nigerian federal structure even at 
the present moment. In Nigeria’s case, 
some scholars (Babalola, 2016; 
Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; 
Elekwaet al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012; Ezeji-
Okoye, 2009) shared that the necessary 
conditions for its federalism among 
others include: 
 
- Tribal and religious differences  
- Fear of domination and measure of   
local autonomy  
- Fear of inter-ethnic rivalry  
- An even development for security 
reason  
- The desire for unity in diversity 
 
Generally, the federal system therefore 
allows such differences and sharing of 
power to preserve the strength and unity 
of the country as the case may be on its 
constitutional provisions. In most cases, 
it is argued that states resort to 
federalism especially when the adoption 
and practice of a unitary system of 
government are not achievable 
(Alsamee et al, 2016). To achieve its 
practice the constitution therefore 
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divides powers between the center and 
the other component units. Burgess 
(1993) hence viewed federalism as a 
practice that represents an action that 
flows from the ideological belief that 
manifests in the society’s varied 
institutions, characters and structures. 
Under this form of government, the 
federation is divided among the units 
(usually the centre and the peripheries) 
and each component of the federation 
has the power of autonomy within its 
area of jurisdiction. In Nigeria’s case, 
the powers shared among the federated 
units (Federal, State and Local 
Governments) are those included on the 
exclusive, concurrent and residual 
legislative lists (1999 constitution, as 
amended; Babalola, 2016; 
Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011;Ewetan, 
2012). As each function and 
responsibility is specified in the 
constitution in the federal system of 
government: 
 
i. The exclusive list means only those 
matters which the federal 
government can make laws or 
polices e.g. external affairs, defense, 
currency, mines and power, 
railways, ports and other matters that 
are regarded to be of national 
significance. 
ii. The concurrent list contains items 
which the federal and state 
governments can make laws or 
polices related to healthcare, 
housing, agriculture, water resource, 
education, etc. 
iii. The residual list contains items not 
mentioned at the exclusive and 
concurrent lists left for the local 
government councils to handle. 
 
While federalism has its varied 
necessities and advantages, on the other 
hand it is considered a divide and rule 
strategy of the British colonialists 
foisted on the country to maintain a 
neo-colonial state apparatus for the 
effective control of the country after 
independence. It has been argued that 
the unitary system of government 
worked well before the introduction of 
federalism and that the colonialists had 
the opportunity of de-emphasizing the 
particularistic tendencies of the 
different ethnic groups in the country 
but for selfish reasons ended up 
creating structural imperfections to fuel 
inter-ethnic relations after 
independence. This standpoint was 
emphasised such that, following the 
coup d’état on January 15, 1966, 
Nigeria’s federal structure underwent a 
change. It is for this reason that late 
General Aguiyi Ironsi, Nigeria’s first 
military Head of State, believing that 
federalism had fostered ethnic disunity 
in the country (Abbas, 2013) abolished 
the then regions and by Decree 34, 
promulgated in May, 1966, established 
a unitary system of government (Ezeji-
Okoye, 2009) thereby concentrating 
economic and political powers at the 
centre. 
 
From pre independence to post 
independence periods, both structures 
established had gradually 
metamorphosed into a three regional 
structure with a weak central 
government in 1960, four regions in 
1963, 19 states in 1969, 23 states in 
1987, 30 states in 1991 and, 36 states 
and Abuja and 774 local government 
councils in 1996 (Elekwa et al, 2011). 
However, this enlargement of the 
federal structural base was mostly 
effected during the nation’s 
development when it was generating 
comfortable revenue (Ezeji-Okoye, 
2009). Over the years, nature of the 
federal states in terms of size, economic 
potential and ethnicity (major ethnic 
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definition of the respective states), has 
continued to define the nature and 
character of Nigerian federalism during 
these military regimes. The question 
commentators keep asking is that has 
the numerical strength of the states 
qualifies them for statehood? This and 
similar other question becomes 
pertinent as the economy of most of the 
state is poor that its survival has 
become a major problem in the nation’s 
body polity. In recent times, in most of 
the states, workers receive their salaries 
several months in arrears. 
 
Similarly, it is this evident weak 
economy of the sates that has made 
them significantly depend on the 
national government for handouts or 
bail out for their basic functions and 
responsibilities. Although, there were 
compelling reasons to the adoption of 
federalism what remains challenging is 
the extent to which the practice of 
federalism has over the years addressed 
the issues of self-determination, 
economic prosperity, and desire for 
unity. The driving force to this debate 
in Nigeria in recent years has been the 
“call for restructuring” or “agitation for 
resource control.” Tochukwu (2002:28-
29) advanced that “resource control” in 
Nigeria means “the right of mineral 
exploration, exploitation and the 
management of resources by the 
communities where these resources are; 
including marketing of the proceeds 
from their land or water.” 
Chukwuemeka and Amobi (2011) 
contend that true federalism implies that 
the federating units in the polity pursue 
their own developmental programmes/ 
projects at their own pace, utilizing 
resources within their territory and 
under their control. Hence, according to 
Chijioke et al (2012) and Ojakorotu 
(2008) resource control is about access 
of state governments/localities to 
natural resources located in their 
boundaries and the freedom to develop 
as well as utilise them without 
interference from the central 
government. 
 
Agitation for Restructuring and 
Resource Control in Nigeria 
Restructuring in the context of Nigeria 
is regarded as a consistent call and 
move for the political reorganisation of 
Nigeria’s federal structure, the system 
of government as well as other aspects 
desired for a constitutional amendment. 
Although, the concept seems new in 
Nigeria’s discourse, Nigerians use 
different terms to identify areas that 
require reorganisation based on 
perceived interest. The key argument 
has always been that Nigeria operates a 
federal system of government and as 
such power is constitutionally shared 
between the central government 
standing for the whole country, and the 
states and local government areas 
serving as a sub-division of the country 
(1999 constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria). Hence, in the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, each level 
of government is assigned executive, 
legislative as well as judicial power and 
responsibilities (1999 constitution, as 
amended; Babalola, 2016; 
Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; 
Ewetan, 2012; Mike, 2004). As agreed 
by these scholars these responsibilities 
however require finance to carry them 
out. 
 
Going further, one of the most 
contentious issues in almost all federal 
states is the question of fiscal 
federalism (Babalola, 2016; 
Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011;Ewetan, 
2012). As advanced earlier by some 
scholars fiscal federalism revolves 
around the constitutional principle for 
     6 
 
Ali Ibrahim Abbas Ph.D. & Sani Garba Wakili                                                                      CUJPIA (2018) 6(1) 1-18 
 
generating/allocating, sharing and 
utilization of funds among the 
constituent parts of a federal state 
(Babalola, 2016; Chukwuemeka & 
Amobi, 2011;Ewetan, 2012). To put it 
clearly, fiscal federalism is thus 
regarded as an aspect of federalism that 
deals with the constitutional definition 
of responsibilities of various tiers of 
government along with laid down 
principles and procedures for sourcing 
revenue among the levels, and for 
sharing the revenue among the 
constituent parts in a manner that 
enables them to fulfill their 
constitutional responsibilities (Angahar, 
2013). This means that fiscal federalism 
becomes necessary for operating a 
federal system of government because 
the functions that the government 
performs are not performed only by the 
central government. In essence, fiscal 
federalism according to Ewetan (2012) 
will mean decentralising financial 
decision making at the lower levels of 
government instead of concentrating the 
power at the center. 
 
While the process is usually 
problematic, such intergovernmental 
relation isalso seen as a very complex 
pattern of interactions, cooperation and 
interdependence between two or more 
levels of government (Angahar, 2013; 
Babalola, 2016; Chukwuemeka & 
Amobi, 2011;Ewetan, 2012). As argued 
by some scholars, in most cases in 
Nigeria, the nature of revenue 
generation and even allocation has 
therefore continued to reflect a 
character of certain complexity that is 
embodied by disagreement among the 
various segments of the country due to 
the revenue sharing formula adopted 
upon (Elekwa et al, 2011). To this end, 
the earlier views of these scholars are 
therefore noteworthy: 
 
The introduction of the 1946 
constitution altered significantly the 
formal unitary structure in existence 
by introducing regionalism to the 
pattern of colonial administration in 
Nigeria. Although the constitution 
was not strictly federal, the creation 
of the regional level of governments 
immediately raised the question of 
allocating revenue to the central 
government, the new regional centers 
and the old Native Authority 
Governments (Adebayo, 1988 as 
cited in Elekwa, Mathew, and 
Akume, 2011). 
 
Similarly, it has been previously 
reported that numerous committees and 
commissions were set up from pre-
colonial to a post-independence era for 
the purpose of working out an 
acceptable revenue sharing formula in 
Nigeria, but yet again agitation for 
restructuring and resource control 
continuous till date. Over the years, 
such bodies included the Chicks 
Commission, 1946; Hick-Phillipson 
Commission, 1950; Chicks 
Commission, 1954; Raisman 
Commission, 1957; Binns Commission, 
1964; Dina Commission, 1969; 
Aboyade Technical Committee, 1977; 
Okigbo Commission, 1979and several 
military and administrative decrees and 
changes respectively among others 
(Elekwa et al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012). 
Hence, the dynamics of these 
commissions, committees, decrees and 
changes have led to the final 
establishment of the National Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal 
Commission (NRMAFC)in 1988.This 
made some scholars (Babalola, 2016; 
Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; 
Dickson & Asua, 2016; Elekwa et al, 
2011; Ewetan, 2012; Madubuike, 
2017)to argue that from the pre-colonial 
up to the present time, agitation for 
resource control has remained the most 
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contentious issue in Nigeria’s fiscal 
relations. 
 
Specifically, this crisis and conflict of 
interest usually resonate politics of oil 
in Nigeria as one scholar posited that: 
…Oil is an object of the struggles 
between classes, factions of classes 
acting either through State 
structures or ethnic identity groups. 
Since oil is power, and power is oil 
in the context of Nigeria’s political 
economy, the struggle for oil power 
becomes a primary object of 
politics, and the inequitable 
distribution of oil highlights 
existing inequalities, competing 
claims, grievances, and even 
conflicts, which conspire to threaten 
the Federal foundations of the 
Nigerian State (Obi as cited in 
Dickson & Asua, 2016:9). 
The dominant argument in Niger-Delta 
region for resource control is that, the 
abandonment of true federalism in 
Nigeria has led to the neglect and 
marginalization of the region and its 
people (Anugwam, 2005; Chijioke et al, 
2012; Madubuike, 2017; Ojakorotu, 
2008; Ottigbe & Ottigbe, 2015).They 
argued that since the bulk of Nigeria’s 
oil wealth is explored from this region, 
the rate of unemployment, poverty, 
environmental degradation and poor 
infrastructural development is 
considered unacceptable (Anugwam, 
2005; Chijioke et al, 2012; Madubuike, 
2017; Ojakorotu, 2008; Ottigbe & 
Ottigbe, 2015). It is therefore not 
surprising that the 9 oil producing states 
of Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Rivers, 
Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Ondo, Abia and 
Imo have continued to agitate for 
resource control in Nigeria vehemently 
(Ottigbe & Ottigbe, 2015).The 
advancements by the indigenous people 
of Niger-Delta individually or in 
groups, who organize peaceful 
movements or violent struggles, are 
claimed to have been addressing 
fundamental developmental challenges 
in the region characterized by neglect, 
poverty, environmental degradation, 
poor infrastructure among others in the 
region. However, while this struggle is 
considered legitimate, the methodology 
adopted over the years has at various 
instances taken extreme and violent 
dimension by militant groups in the 
region thereby threatening the nation’s 
peace and security. 
 
With regard to call for resource control 
and true federalism, the people of the 
Niger Delta region are not alone. For 
instance, since the return of democratic 
governance in Nigeria in May 1999, 
there has been in some instances a 
coordinated attempt by the Southern 
Governors to advance the call for 
resource control and true federalism. To 
be specific, in one instance, the 
Southern Governors Forum at a 
conference had issued a 17-point 
communiqué, which among others 
resolved that: 
 
That resource control and derivation 
should henceforth and be accepted as 
the basis for revenue generation and 
allocation; and that Nigerian's federal 
status as presently constituted be 
restructured along a legal framework 
that would grant a reasonable 
measure of autonomy to the states 
and component parts of the 
federation" (Omenma, 2002:1).  
 
Although, the current poor socio-
economic situation of all Nigerians 
across the regions does not show sign of 
significant improvement in citizens’ 
living standard, it is evident that the 
Southern part of Nigeria is not the only 
region in this quagmire. In fact, in most 
cases, the Northern part of Nigeria is 
worst off in most development indices 
when compared with the other regions. 
The analysis of the developmental crisis 
in the Niger-Delta or every other region 
for that matter thus requires an 
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exposition beyond the question of “true 
federalism and resource control”. 
Earlier studies have shown that massive 
corruption, embezzlement of public 
fund, poor accountability; high cost of 
governance and the crisis of legitimacy; 
recurring ethnic, regional and religious 
clashes; abuse of constitution and 
constitutionalism, etc have thwarted 
Nigeria’s socio-economic and political 
development of post military era 
(Abbas, 2013; 2016; Babalola, 2016; 
Ezeji-Okoye, 2009).  
 
 
Among challenges mentioned above, 
earlier studies have specifically shown 
that corruption remains an aspect of 
Nigeria’s political economy that must 
be looked in to while analysing its 
socio-economic development (Babalola, 
2016). Indeed, it has been argued that 
corruption is a serious threat to the 
economic development of Nigeria 
(Abbas, 2013; Babalola, 2016; Ezeji-
Okoye, 2009). There is evidence that 
embezzlement of public fund, the high 
cost of governance as a result of 
inflation of contracts as well as 
irresponsible economic management in 
Nigeria is a hindrance to its 
development (Babalola, 2016; Lawan, 
2014). By this argument, corruption is a 
serious factor in the stagnation and 
underdevelopment in Nigeria. More 
worrisomely, the failure of the Nigerian 
government at all levels of governance 
to give the desired attention to the 
development of the nation in spite of its 
enormous human and material 
resources is considered a serious 
setback. In fact, almost every region but 
more specifically in the North, is 
characterized by the absence of basic 
infrastructure, social services, non-oil 
industries and petroleum products. 
While Nigeria remains a Federal 
republic, every part of the country 
whether, North or South, East or West, 
there is widespread political neglect, 
social and economic underdevelopment 
that needs to be addressed. 
 
Agitations for Restructuring in 
Nigeria: Some Contentious Issues 
Nigeria’s experience of federalism over 
years is characterized by and also 
dominated by the above intricacies as a 
solution to one problem leads to another 
and without a genuine desire to forge 
ahead. Hence, what are the areas of 
contentions or dissatisfactions that have 
over the years led to agitation for 
restructuring, by extension responsible 
for threatening the political stability of 
Nigeria in particular and its corporate 
existence in general? 
 
Call for Devolution of Power: there is 
common agreement among scholars and 
commentators that the exclusive 
legislative list of the federal 
government of Nigeria is too heavy 
(Babalola, 2016; Chukwuemeka & 
Amobi, 2011; Elekwa et al, 2011; 
Ewetan, 2012; Ezeji-Okoye, 2009; 
Ottigbe & Ottigbe, 2015).It is therefore 
argued that since the constitution grants 
more power to the Federal Government 
through the exclusive list such as the 
control of mineral resources in the 
country the over centralization and 
concentration of powers at the centre is 
considered a dirge for the Nigerian 
federation (Babalola, 2016; 
Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; Elekwa 
et al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012; Ezeji-Okoye, 
2009; Ottigbe & Ottigbe, 2015). The 
simple reason being one of the cardinal 
principles of federalism which is 
substantial autonomy is suffocated by 
this factor. It is interesting to note that 
majority of the state governments are 
calling for the reduction of items on the 
exclusive list and put them under the 
jurisdiction of the states. In the area of 
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fiscal practice of federalism, with a 
more power concentrated at the center 
by the constitution (Alsamee et al, 
2016)the main functions and 
responsibilities of resources allocation 
therefore lie with the central 
government. Hence, the distribution of 
power remains one of the hottest issues 
even in Nigeria’s federalism. 
 
More interestingly, because access to 
central political power in Nigeria is a 
considered a license to be in charge of 
huge resource allocation (Abbas, 2013; 
Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011), the 
controlling power continue to allocate a 
large percentage of such resources to its 
own advantage. In fact, these among 
other factors make leadership position 
at the centre very attractive and a do or 
die affair (Abbas, 2013; 2016). It 
should however not be forgotten that 
the principle of fiscal federalism 
requires that there must be sufficient 
resources to support both central and 
component units without which the 
federation cannot stand (Babalola, 
2016; Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; 
Elekwa et al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012; 
Ottigbe & Ottigbe, 2015). It is in this 
regard that Tochukwu (2002:27) 
submits that devolution of power with 
corresponding constitutional functions 
and responsibilities to all the 
component units will reduce ethnic 
tension, unemployment, poverty, 
environmental degradation, low 
infrastructural development and the cry 
of marginalization in Nigeria. As earlier 
advanced by Alsamee et al(2016), the 
devolution of power with defined duties 
and responsibilities to each federating 
authority will reduce the burden and 
expenses of the federal government 
hence allowing component units of the 
federation to determine the needs of its 
people and satisfy them easily through 
specialisation. 
 
Review of Revenue Sharing Formula: 
This is an aspect of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations that deals with 
constitutional power for a generation 
and sharing of revenue by different 
levels of government. For instance, 
since early 2000 the vertical formula 
has been Federal Government(52.68%), 
State Governments(26.72%) and Local 
Governments (20.60%). While this has 
been practiced over the years, the 
practice of fiscal federalism in Nigeria 
has not brought about the needed socio-
economic development as envisaged by 
the architects and advocates of the 
system (Babalola, 2016; Chukwuemeka 
& Amobi, 2011; Elekwa et al, 2011; 
Ewetan, 2012; Ottigbe & Ottigbe, 
2015).  Most of the scholars identified 
such hindrances to the country’s 
dependence on oil revenue and its over 
concentration of economic resources at 
the federal level (Babalola, 2016; 
Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; Elekwa 
et al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012; Ottigbe & 
Ottigbe, 2015).Specifically, Babalola 
(2016) advanced that if Nigeria’s 
current fiscal arrangement is to advance 
its constitutional economic objectives, 
this clear contradiction of over 
centralizing economic resources at the 
center must be addressed. 
 
Moreover, it is as result of this 
dominance of the federal government 
with regards to the proportion of 
revenue allocation to the center that 
agitation for a review of revenue 
sharing formula had continued 
unabated. Although Nigeria’s revenue 
allocation formula has over the years 
recorded changes but what seems 
unchanged is the allocation of lion 
share of centrally generated revenue to 
the federal government (Babalola, 
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2016; Chukwuemeka &Amobi, 2011; 
Ewetan, 2012). As explained earlier, the 
vertical allocation formula since 2000 
has been in the favour of the federal 
government thereby ensuring what 
some scholars referred to as “federal 
dominance in fiscal matters” (Babalola, 
2016). For horizontal allocation, the 
1999 constitution of Nigeria provides 
the principles of “population, 
derivation, equality of states, internal 
revenue generation, land mass, needs 
and even development, etc” (Babalola, 
2016; Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; 
Ewetan, 2012). While there is common 
ground among the state governors that 
the higher proportion of revenue shall 
be allocated to the state government, 
there are concerns in the principle of 
derivation. 
 
Beyond the general principle of 
allocation, the Nigerian constitution 
provides no less than 13% of revenues 
generated from natural resource be 
allocated based on the principle of 
derivation. This means that since 
Nigeria’s revenue majorly depends on 
oil, the “oil producing states” are thus 
entitled to 13% derivation from the oil 
sales in addition to the statutory 
allocation from the federal government. 
While the derivation principle is 
captured in the constitution, its 
application has always raised eye brows 
and controversies among the elites of 
each region with a geo-political 
dimension (Anugwam, 2005; Babalola, 
2015; Chijiokeet al, 2012; Elekwa et al, 
2011; Madubuike, 2015; Ojakorotu, 
2008). While the oil producing states 
continue to demand anincrease in 
derivation from 13% to 50% 
(Madubuike, 2015; Ojakorotu, 2008; 
Ottigbe & Ottigbe, 2015,Several 
National Political Reform Conference), 
other regions argue in favour of the 
advancement of the principle equality 
and population. The main argument has 
been that since oil like other natural 
resources is a gift of nature, it therefore 
belongs to all Nigerians irrespective of 
tribe or region (Babalola, 2016) that 
must not be exclusively allocated to a 
certain region or people.  
 
Creation of More States: since 
independence, Nigeria has witnessed 
numerous movements for state creation 
from all angles or regions in the polity. 
Generally, the main rationales behind 
the creation of states in Nigeria were to 
address various economic, political and 
socio-cultural issues in the country 
(Ezeji-Okoye, 2009). In fact, it is based 
on this continues quest that, some 
groups are still calling for the creation 
of more states. It has been advanced 
that fiscal decentralisation of public 
spending responsibilities in federal 
states brings about economic 
development (Alsamee et al, 2016; 
Babalola, 2016). At a variance with the 
federal government where the states are 
dependent on the all-powerful federal 
government, this has triggered a lot of 
robust agitation for the creation for 
more states in order to achieve massive 
devolution of powers to sub national 
levels. Scholars argued that true fiscal 
federalism has never been practiced in 
Nigeria in its real sense (Babalola, 
2016; Chukwuemeka & Amobi, 2011; 
Elekwa et al, 2011; Ewetan, 2012). 
Therefore, in Nigeria “true federalism” 
was only practiced between 1954 and 
1966, a period characterized by massive 
devolution of powers to the regions. 
 
It is on record that the period of military 
rule witnessed a reduction of power of 
the regions and subsequently more 
states and local government areas were 
over the years created as reflected in the 
constitutions (Ezeji-Okoye, 2009). 
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However, in spite of the series of 
structural changes that took place under 
the military regimes occasioned by 
agitations by several interest groups, the 
current number of states in Nigeria is 
considered by some interest groups as 
imbalanced. In terms of geo-political 
zones, North-West has (7 states), North-
East(6states), North-Central (6 states), 
South-West (6states), South-South (6 
states) and South East (5 states). Not 
minding the population, land size and 
other consideration fora such number of 
states in each geo political zones, what 
is regarded as imbalance have provoked 
serious agitations especially by the 
South-East and the Igbo communities in 
the country(Ezeji-Okoye, 2009). Their 
argument has been that since every geo 
political region in Nigeria has at least 6 
states, except the South East; there 
should be at least an equal proportion of 
such states. Such call for an equal 
proportion of states however does not 
consider other determinants for state 
creation especially population, land 
mass, etc. 
 
Return to Regional Federalism and 
Parliamentary System of 
Government: over the years, there 
have been calls to the return to federal 
structure based on the 6 geo-political 
zones of the country as witnessed in the 
1960s. Although Nigeria federalism and 
presidential system which started since 
1979 has been operating, it has not been 
satisfactory to most of the stakeholders. 
While the changing forms and 
structures of the federation from 3 
regional structure in 1960, 4 regions in 
1963, 19 states in 1969, 23 states in 
1987, 30 states in 1991 and, 36 states 
and Abuja (the FCT) and 774 local 
government councils in 1996 (Elekwa 
et al, 2011;Ezeji-Okoye, 2009), the fact 
still remains that most of them (states 
and local governments) were created 
along macro or micro-ethnic lines. 
Their consequence is that, the intra and 
interethnic discord which largely 
resulted from inequality of ethnic 
representation even in the 1960s is 
resurfacing at the state and local levels. 
In essence, current Nigeria’s federalism 
has only rotated between the factor of 
extreme regionalism that characterized 
the pre-independence and first republic 
era as well as the centrality of the 
military and to some extent the post 
military era. The wider implication is an 
enlargement of the federal 
government’s power even at the state 
and local levels. Hence, the call for 
what was “better days” in the 1960’s 
that is the return to the former regional 
federalism and parliamentary system of 
government. 
 
Even more recently, some prominent 
leaders of the Yoruba nation (in a 
summit at Ibadan on 9/9/2017have 
advocated for the return to regional 
government based on the 1960 and or 
1963 constitution (TVC news, 2017). In 
fact, some proponents of restructuring 
have argued that the current presidential 
system of government being practiced 
in Nigeria over the years is too costly 
and expensive to run in terms of 
financial management. Hence, the 
recent calls for the return to a 
parliamentary system of government in 
order to reduce the cost of governance 
in the country are considered justifiable. 
The main argument is that under a 
parliamentary system, members of the 
parliament are members of the 
executive hence a possible reduction in 
the cost of governance. In furtherance 
of the saving cost argument, some 
proponents are even advocating for part 
time legislators instead of the 
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permanent who in some cases are either 
idle or attending to unnecessary issues. 
 
Reorganization of the Nigerian 
Police: due to the upsurge in violent 
and non-violent cases of crimes and the 
inability of highly centralised police to 
prove it worth across Nigeria 
(Agwanwo, 2014; Egunjobi, 2016) 
there are calls from some quotas that 
the current Nigerian Police Force (NPF) 
be reorganised to face the current 
realities. These calls are not farfetched 
from the fact that there is a wave of 
recurring conflicts/insecurity such as 
insurgency, armed robbery, kidnapping, 
herdsmen/farmers clashes, among other 
insecurity challenges across the country 
that the NPF fails to address. Moreover, 
the failure of the current NPF to 
efficiently perform its constitutional 
duties, among others factors, is now 
blamed on the over-centralization of the 
force (Agwanwo, 2014; Egunjobi, 
2016). To address this problem, two 
options remain the most common 
views. While some are calling for the 
decentralisation of the current NPF 
through the establishment of state 
police, others are emphasising the need 
for reform or reorganisation of the force 
to serve Nigerians better. 
 
For the proponents of the establishment 
of state police, they argue that it will 
help in curbing the current high rates of 
recurring criminal acts in the polity as it 
is expected to comprise officers who 
understand the language, geography and 
the peculiar security challenge of the 
people they would be policing 
(Agwanwo, 2014). To advance this 
particular argument, this view is worth 
sharing: 
 
One argument for the establishment 
of state police is based on the need 
to reduce crime to its barest. Crime 
occurs in every “community” and is 
perpetrated by those who in most 
cases, come from that community 
or locality. To deal with crime 
therefore, there is an urgent need to 
ensure that “locals are absorbed and 
posted to their various localities to 
fish out the criminals (Agwanwo, 
2014:170). 
 
Beyond the argument for absorbing 
locals in addressing local security 
challenges, the call for state police will 
unravel the current “nominal role state 
governor’s play as the Chief Security 
Officer of their states” (Agwanwo, 
2014:170). The argument has been that 
while the constitution stipulates that 
state governors are the Chief Security 
Officers of their respective states, in 
reality they lack such power to function. 
Instead, the Commissioners of Police 
who are appointed by the Inspector 
General of Police does such function. 
Furthermore, since Nigeria operates a 
federal system of government, it is 
argued that the roles and responsibilities 
of the protection of lives and properties 
of the citizens shall be decentralised 
like in other federal democracies such 
as in the USA (Agwanwo, 2014). It is 
advanced that such calls are for the 
“constitutional devolution of power to 
establish, organise, maintain and 
control the police by sub-national units 
making up the Nigerian federation” 
(Egunjobi, 2016:1). Similarly, such 
creation of state police will reduce the 
current youth unemployment that in 
itself is considered a security threat to 
most communities and the nation in 
general. 
 
While the call for state police is 
considered advantageous by some 
quotas, these calls have also received 
criticisms championed by eminent 
Nigerians such the former President of 
Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, current 
President Muhammadu Buhari, former 
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Inspectors General of Police, Sunday 
Ehindero and Mohammed Abubakar, 
and the Northern Governors Forum, 
among other stakeholders (Agwanwo, 
2014).Their fears may not be divorced 
from the experiences Nigerians have 
had during the era of Native Authority 
Police that operated under the then local 
government in the Western and 
Northern regions in the 1960s 
(Egunjobi, 2016). As reported by the 
scholars, while the idea of state police 
may be theoretically good, in this 
political environment in Nigeria, the 
fear is that the system may be abused 
by some sitting governments as was the 
case in the 1960s (Agwanwo, 2014; 
Egunjobi, 2016). The best option 
therefore according to this group is the 
advancement of the effective 
reformation of the current NPF to serve 
all Nigerian better. They further argued 
the multiplicity of state police 
formations with different state laws can 
be very difficult to manage especially in 
a complex country like Nigeria. Even 
more worrisome is that with many 
states of federation unable to pay their 
salaries for months, the funding of state 
police is unlikely. 
 
Removal of Immunity Clause, 
Appropriate Role of Tradition Rulers 
and Recognition of Indigenous 
People: section  308 (1-3) of the 1999 
constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (as amended) provides that no 
criminal or civil proceedings shall be 
instituted or continued against a person 
holding the office of the President or 
Vice-President, Governor or Deputy 
Governor while in office. Some 
advocates of restructuring are calling 
for the removal or review of this section 
because it gives room for the abuse of 
entrusted power. The argument is that, 
this immunity clause had been abused 
by the holders of the key executive 
offices without due recourse to rule of 
law of the land and accountability to the 
people. While this position remains 
valid, there are fears that if this 
objective is attained most elected 
executive officials will be distracted 
from delivering their basic duties and 
responsibilities to the citizens. This 
means that, while the idea is considered 
a good one it should however be treated 
with caution especially by considering 
the current political environment in 
Nigeria characterised by lack of 
genuine opposition. 
 
In another case, the roles of traditional 
rulers in Nigeria are not constitutionally 
recognised with clearly defined roles or 
responsibilities. Hence, some 
individuals and groups are advocating 
for constitutional recognition of 
traditional rulers in Nigeria with clearly 
defined responsibilities not the current 
advisory roles in local decision making 
through Emirates and kingdoms. Their 
main argument is that during pre-
colonial, colonial and early post-
independence era traditional rulers were 
key players in the area of governance in 
various regions and capacities in the 
country. This was until 1976, when the 
then military government introduced a 
uniform local government 
administration system in the country. 
Consequent upon this, traditional rulers 
were insulated from politics and 
formally assigned advisory roles which 
are not binding on the elected local 
government authority (Fatile and 
Adejuwon, 2009). This therefore means 
the return to status quo to pre 1976 
where most traditional rulers in the 
country had constitutionally assigned 
roles and responsibilities. 
 
In another respect, the indigenous 
people of Federal Capital Territory 
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(Abuja) under the banner of Original 
Inhabitants Development Association 
(OIDA) are calling for the amendment 
of the 1999 constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria to reflect the 
cosmopolitan nature of Abuja. The 
indigenes are calling for the 
establishment of an elected office of the 
governor just like other states of the 
federation. The current appointment of 
a minister by the President they insist is 
not justifiable as there would be more 
accountability and development if a 
governor were to be elected by the 
citizens of the area. Hence, the OIDA 
proposes a restructuring based on the 
devolution of power from the federal 
authorities to Federal Capital Territory 
Authority (Daily Trust, 2017). The 
Abuja locals are not the only ones in 
this quest. There are calls from Lagos 
(former capital of Nigeria) due to its 
cosmopolitan nature, as well as its 
strategic importance to the nation’s 
development, that there shall be an 
established office of the mayor as in the 
case of other big cities in the world. 
 
Constitutional Basis for 
Restructuring Nigeria’s Federalism. 
While most of the issues raised earlier 
are considered valid, the shoddy 
practice of federalism in Nigeria has 
resulted in the emergence of ethnic, 
regional or religious based groups most 
of which are militant in nature 
championing one agitation or another 
for the internal autonomy of their 
people as captured below: 
 
In current Nigeria’s case, its realities 
reflect this thinking, with over 250 
tribes and ethnic groupings mostly 
guided or misguided by different 
religions and regions in the country. 
The relevance of Afenifere, Ohaneze 
N’digbo, Arewa Consultative Forum, 
Southern Leaders Forum, and Ijaw 
National Congress etc- each 
representing sectoral cleavages said 
it all (Abbas, 2016:221). 
With some of these other groups in this 
bracket such as the Odua People 
Congress (OPC) in the West, 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) in the South-South, 
Movement for the Actualization of 
Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) 
in the South-East, Arewa Consultative 
Forum (ACF) in the North among 
others (Abbas, 2013; 2016; Ezeji-
Okoye, 2009), they remain nothing but 
arrow heads of their different social and 
political cleavages. Over the years, 
other issues that have been presented 
and defended by the sesocio-political 
groups include the rotational 
presidency, claims and counter claims 
of marginalization, local government 
financial autonomy, sovereign national 
conference, adopting unicameral 
legislature in place of the bicameral 
legislature at the national level, among 
several others. While these issues 
among several key others as indicated 
above have been in discussion over the 
years, fiscal restructuring could be 
achieved through the rebuilding of the 
economic landscape through good 
governance, transparency and 
accountability. 
 
It should however be noted that in some 
cases, most aspects highlighted require 
reorganisation or constitutional 
amendment.  This is due to the fact 
agitations for restructuring are affected 
by one constitutional section or the 
other. Therefore, for a meaningful 
restructuring in Nigeria to take place, a 
total overhauling if not amendment of 
the entire 1999 constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (as 
amended) is considered an alternative. 
This means that going by section 9 (2) 
of 1999 constitution of Nigeria (as 
amended), an Act of the National 
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Assembly for the alteration of this 
constitution, shall not be passed in 
either House of the National Assembly 
unless the proposal is supported by the 
votes of no less than two-third majority 
of all members of that House and 
approved by resolution of the Houses of 
Assemblies of not less than two-thirds 
of all the states. 
 
However, depending on area or aspect 
that requires restructuring, it has been 
advanced that; one reason for 
restructuring is to improve national 
unity and peace for peaceful co-
existence, political stability and 
balanced national development. With 
regards to implication for the 
restructuring, Nigeria’s constitution 
provides a legal basis for the general 
operation of government (levels and 
organs) as well as the procedure for 
amendment through a joint resolution of 
the National Assembly and States 
Houses of Assemblies. It means that 
amending Nigeria’s constitution for the 
purpose of restructuring requires an 
approval of the two-third majority of 
the 36 State Houses of Assemblies 
(SHOAs) across the country, 
particularly with regard to fiscal 
restructuring and true federalism to 
scale through. This is also to take into 
consideration the number of states 
across geographical regions of the 
country and their economic positions. 
 
Conclusion and the Way Forward 
Basically there is no doubt that the 
federal system of Nigeria is in serious 
crisis due to agitation for restructuring 
and resource control. However, in spite 
of the shortcomings of federalism being 
practiced in Nigeria, federalism is still 
the only suitable system of government 
that can be used to govern a 
heterogeneous multi-cultural and 
religious society like Nigeria. As the 
political system continues to evolve, 
and change forms and structure, it is 
expected that an acceptable federal 
system that will take care of agitations 
from the every component units may 
emerge. This however requires that all 
Nigerians resolve to love and appreciate 
one another and respects each other’s 
desire and feeling towards achieving 
one united, and prosperous Nigeria 
through selfless determination, 
commitment, sacrifice and patriotism. 
 
In order to address the ongoing 
agitation for restructuring and resource 
control, the paper hence suggests the 
following: 
1. Where it is considered necessary, and 
for the purpose of promoting national 
unity and political stability, relevant 
constitutional sections being sought 
for change should be amended with 
national interest as the main guiding 
post. 
2. The government at all levels of 
governance structure should address 
corruption in order to achieve 
meaningful development across 
regions of the country. 
3. A number of issues raised for 
restructuring, cannot be addressed in 
isolation of the effective and efficient 
implementation of government’s 
socio-economic policies and 
programmes through strict adherence 
to the constitution. 
4. It is a reality that every region in 
Nigeria is in a serious developmental 
crisis that requires people centered 
utilization of the federal, state and 
local government’s allocation meant 
for the welfare of the citizenry
. 
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